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Abstract
The interdependency across natural gas, power and heating systems is increasingly
tightened due to the wide development of cogeneration plants and electrified heating
facilities. Multi-energy integration is a prevalent trend and the energy hub, which acts
as an intermediary agent between providers and consumers, is expected to play a central
role in allocating energy resources more efficiently. However, uncertainties originat-
ing from multiple kinds of energy demands challenge the operation of energy hubs and
may compromise system efficiency. Energy trading and sharing among individual hubs
offer a unique opportunity to increase system flexibility and reduce the cost under de-
mand uncertainty. In this paper, three quintessential schemes for organizing a cluster of
energy hubs at demand side, i.e., individual, sharing market, and aggregation, are stud-
ied under a stochastic framework with probabilistic load forecasts. First, we perform
theoretical analysis and compare their economic efficiencies from a maximum-utility
(or minimum-cost) perspective. Utility curves of respective schemes are given, and
several important phenomena are revealed from the economic analysis. Then we dis-
cuss the concrete decision-making models of energy hubs under the three schemes,
taking into account the change of electricity price in response to the total demand,
which give rise to bilevel optimization problems and are technically transformed into
mixed-integer linear programs. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments, which val-
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idate the theoretical outcomes, and reveal that the sharing scheme can achieve nearly
optimal efficiency without a central organizer, and hence appears to be a promising
direction for future multi-energy systems.
Keywords: Demand uncertainty, energy hub, energy-sharing market, multi-carrier
energy system, organization scheme, stochastic bilevel game.
Nomenclature
Indices and Sets
i Index of energy hubs
t Index of time periods
ω Index of scenarios
j Index of power generators
n Index of buses in power system
Parameter
NE The number of energy hubs
ηeh Efficiency of electricity to heat conversion
ηgh Efficiency of gas to heat conversion
ηge Efficiency of gas to electricity conversion
λ ect ,λe Electricity price in the day-ahead market
λ gct ,λg Natural gas price in the day-ahead market
λMt,ω ,λM Gas-to-power price in the sharing market
rmn,xmn Resistance/Reactance of line mn
vn,vn Bounds of voltage magnitude square at bus n
P j,P j Bounds of active output of unit j
Q j,Q j Bounds of reactive output of unit j
lmn Square current capacity of line mn
pln,q
l
n Active/reactive electricity demand at bus n
c j Cost of generation unit j
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pi , piω Probability of each scenario
I¯ Budget of the energy hub
de,l˜eit,ω Real-time power demand
dh,l˜hit,ω Real-time heat demand
Em,Hm The capacity of power/heat storage unit
R±pm,R
±
hm Maximum charge/discharge rate of storage unit
M A large enough constant
(ps,λs) Breakpoints in piecewise linear technique
Decision Variable
θ The expenditure of power
ρit Proportion of power converted into heat
pe,init ,p
g,in
it Input electricity/gas of the energy hub
pe,outit ,p
h,out
it Output electricity/heat of the energy hub
pdisit ,p
ch
it Discharge/charge rate of power storage unit
hdisit ,h
ch
it Discharge/charge rate of heat storage unit
λ ert,ω ,λ hrt,ω Price of electricity/heat in the real-time market
uit ,sit Binary variables indicate the status of storages
Et ,Ht Energy amount of power storage/heat storage
pe0it ,p
g0
it Contracted power/gas in day-ahead market
δ e+it,ω ,δ
h+
it,ω Power/heat bought from the real-time market
δ e−it,ω ,δ
h−
it,ω Power/heat sold to the real-time market
pexit,ω Energy exchange in the sharing market
p j,q j The active/reactive output of power generator j
lmn Square of the current in line mn
vn Square of voltage magnitude at bus n
Pmn Active power flow in line mn
Qmn Reactive power flow in line mn
λn Dual variable of the power balancing condition
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αs Continuous weight variables used in piecewise linear technique
βs Binary variables used in piecewise linear technique
γs Auxiliary variables used in objective function linearization
1. Introduction
Due to the synergy among different energy carriers [1], traditionally independently
operated energy infrastructures such as the power grid, heating system, and natural gas
system are now becoming increasingly interdependent because of the proliferation of
co-generation plants, energy conversion devices, and energy storage units. Gas-fired
combined heat and power (CHP) units have been proved to be more efficient compared
with the separate production (an illustrative example can be found in [2]). The state-
of-art air-source/ground-source heat pumps have a coefficient-of-performance (COP)
up to 3-5 [3], which means that 3-5 times thermal energy can be extracted by con-
suming merely one unit amount of electricity. Although electric boilers have relative
lower electricity-heat efficiency, they are very cheap to deploy and can absorb excessive
renewable generation which is otherwise curtailed. In Europe, nearly 11% of its elec-
tricity was generated via cogeneration [4] while Demark, the Netherlands and Finland
are the world’s most intensive cogeneration economies [5]. In Germany, over 50% of
the nation’s total electricity demand could be provided by cogeneration and it aims to
double the share of cogeneration by 2020 [6]. In the UK, there has been a trend towards
“multi-utility” bundling [7], increasing the coupling of multiple energy markets. CHP
is already an important resource for the United State and constitutes 8% of generation
capacity [8]. In this regard, the interdependence across multiple energy infrastructures
will become more prevalent, especially in the countries/regions with long cold winter,
creating strong interdependency in energy flow and market behavior [9].
Coordinated operation of multi-carrier energy systems has become a hot topic in
recent years. The flexibility of combined heat and power system with thermal storage
was evaluated based on a generic model in [10]. The energy flow of combined cooling
heating and power system was analyzed under electrical demand management mode
and thermal demand management mode respectively in [11]. The efficiency of separate
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operation and combined operation of heat and power production were compared in
[12]. In many researches mentioned above, an implicit assumption is that a central
operator has the authority to control components in all related systems. However, in
current practice, different energy systems are usually owned or governed by individual
entities, which may be unwilling to accept compulsory dispatch orders. In this regard,
energy markets turn out to play an important role in allocating resources in a fairer way,
since individual market participants can make decisions regarding their own purposes.
The modeling and strategic planning methods of sustainable interdependent networks
were presented in [13], where typical application examples can also be found.
The power market has been studied for decades. One classic organization is the
pool-based market with the locational marginal price (LMP) scheme [14]. Traditional
power market appears at the transmission level, and the market clearing comes down to
a direct-current (DC) optimal power flow (OPF) problem [15]. Smart grid technologies
allow the similar paradigm to be implemented in distribution systems. However, be-
cause the resistance to reactance ratio (r/X) of distribution lines is higher than that in
transmission grids, the alternating current (AC) OPF model is used to clear the distribu-
tion market [16]. The gas market is much less competitive and flexible than the electric-
ity market. In the gas spot market, the price tends to be proportional to the gas demand
and usually remains unchanged throughout a day [17]. To study the strategic interac-
tions among multiple stakeholders in the gas market, a generalized Nash-Cournot game
model was proposed in [18], and complementarity programming models were devel-
oped in [19] which were applied in South Stream [20]. As we restrict our attentions on
the intra-day transaction, the gas price is assumed to be fixed as in [21].
With the increasingly tightened coupling of energy systems with multiple carri-
ers, the advent of integrated energy markets will greatly promote energy transaction
and sharing among different physical systems. Along this line of research, the market
power of natural gas producers on the power market was investigated in [22]. A multi-
lateral trading model for the gas-heat-power coupled system was proposed in [23] and
the market behaviors of different energy systems were considered. In [24], a strategic
offering model for the gas-power system was presented. The gas market is cleared in a
similar way as the power market. All the studies above consider the real-time market
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without uncertainty. However, in the day-ahead market, the uncertain factors such as
load forecast errors can no longer be neglected and may affect the real-time decisions.
In power market analysis, the impacts of load and price uncertainties have been
investigated. Because of the competition and strategic behaviors of individual market
participants, incorporating uncertainty in a market equilibrium model is much more
difficult than doing so in a centralized dispatch problem. For the supply-side power
market, a robust Cournot-Bertrand model was proposed in [25] to mimic risk-averse
bidding strategies of generation companies in a congested power grid. Reference [26]
proposed a day-ahead decentralized energy trading algorithm for power grid with gen-
eration uncertainty. A robust Nash game model was suggested in [27] to describe the
market equilibrium of hydro-dominated power systems with strategic producers and
water inflow uncertainty. For the demand-side market, the retailer is expected to play
an active role. A stochastic optimization method was used in [28] to optimize the
medium-term decision making for a power retailer. Uncertainty of future pool prices,
client demands, and rival-retailer prices are taken into account. A stochastic multi-
objective Nash-Cournot model was adopted in [29] to simulate the demand response
under load uncertainty. A game based linear approach for retailer’s scheduling under
uncertain pool prices and load demands was presented in [30]. The scenario generation
method and conditional value at risk (CVaR) are used for risk measurement. Bilateral
contracting and selling price determination problem for an electricity retailer under
load uncertainty was proposed in [31]. Three pricing cases are compared, including
the fixed pricing, time-of-use pricing and real-time pricing. The bidding and pricing
strategies of retailer under market price uncertainty was studied in [32] using a robust
bilevel programming model.
In a multi-energy system, energy hub is a new concept and initiatively related with
multi-carrier energy linking [33]. An energy hub can be modeled as a multi-input
multi-output prosumer which can receive, send, convert and store different types of
energies [34]. In this sense, other energy system integration concepts with multiple
energy inputs and multiple energy outputs can be described as a sort of energy hubs.
For example, reference [35] modeled the networked micro-grids using the concept of
multi-carrier energy hub, while an energy hub model was used to describe interactions
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Figure 1: Sketch of three organization schemes.
among multiple energy systems in [36]. Application of the energy hub concept for
the description of tri-generation devices was reported in [37]. Models for integrated
energy and transportation systems were presented in [38]. The energy hub idea was also
picked up by a municipal utility in Switzerland to model a micro-system containing
wood chip gasification, methanation and a cogeneration plant [33]. After years of
wonderful research, deterministic decision making for the energy hub dispatch problem
has become a relatively mature field. Some works incorporating uncertainties have
been carried out. For example, the decision-making problem of multi-energy players
participating in the electricity market considering uncertain renewable energies was
modeled in [39]. A stochastic bi-level model for energy hub manager was developed
in [40]. The hub manager seeks to maximize its profit by selling electricity and heat
under uncertain pool prices and load uncertainty.
A main research focus of energy hub is the modeling method to enable the in-
corporation of different energy facilities. This issue has been studied in the existing
literature by using the automatic construction procedure [41], the block schematic di-
agram method [42], the decoupling method [43] and the linearized modeling method
[36], to name a few. Another important problem is the business model of energy hubs
taking their self-regarding behaviors into account, calling for a thorough study on trad-
ing scheme design, which is exactly the main motivation of this paper. The real-time
scheduling of energy hubs in a dynamic pricing market was modeled as an exact po-
tential game in [44] and an online distributed algorithm was proposed to find the Nash
Equilibrium (NE). The existence and uniqueness of the NE was also investigated.
Different from aforementioned studies, which aim to provide optimal strategies
for participants in a market, this paper investigates the economic efficiencies of three
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typical organization schemes, i.e., individual scheme, sharing scheme and aggregation
scheme, of a cluster of energy hubs from a maximum-utility (or minimum-cost) per-
spective. A visual representation of three typical organization schemes is shown in
Figure 1. Specifically, we consider an integrated energy system with electricity, natural
gas as well as heat. The proposed model describes a bilevel trading framework which
allows allocating a certain portion of resources in the upper level and coping with un-
certainty in the lower level. Day-ahead and real-time markets are the most common
and mature ones in the current electricity industry, and therefore are studied in this
paper. The proposed method can be easily extended to problems with different time
scales. The main contributions of this paper are twofold.
1) Theoretical analysis on the economic efficiencies of three typical energy-hub
organization schemes. The economic efficiencies of individual, sharing, and ag-
gregation schemes for energy transaction are examined from a maximum-utility (or
minimum-cost) perspective under inaccurate load forecasts. Under reasonable as-
sumptions, we prove that the aggregation scheme is the most efficient while the
individual scheme is the most inefficient due to the lack of flexibility in real-time
energy exchange. By allowing real-time energy transaction restricted by a fixed
exchanging rate, which serves as the price in the sharing market, the efficiency of
sharing scheme is in-between, but very close to the aggregation scheme, implying
its promising perspective. The price in the sharing market is also revealed.
2) Concrete mathematical formulation of the three market schemes in a demand-
side integrated energy system and characterization of the market equilibrium.
First, a bilevel framework of the studied system is set forth. In the pool-based
market level, an ACOPF model is used to clear the distribution power market and
retrieve the electricity price while the natural gas price and heat price are assumed
as fixed values. In the demand-side integrated energy system level, stochastic op-
timization is employed to model the strategic behaviors of individual energy hubs.
Aforementioned organization schemes are modeled via different constraints on en-
ergy exchange and allocation. To identify the market equilibria, the mathemati-
cal models are reformulated as mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs) based upon
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duality theory, linearization techniques and two properties of potential game and
cooperative game. Finally, the proposed models are used to test and quantify the
performance gaps of the three schemes using typical system data. Our method pro-
vides a systematic approach to formulating and efficiently computing equilibria of
multi-energy markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Theoretical analysis is given in
Section 2 to compare the economical efficiencies of the three energy hub organization
schemes. The practical implementation and mathematical formulations of the energy
hub decision-making under three organization schemes are presented in Section 3. So-
lution methodology is developed in Section 4. Case studies are performed in Section
5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Economical Efficiency: Theoretical Analysis
Starting from a abstract formulation, we present a theoretical analysis on the effi-
ciency of different organization schemes in the integrated energy systems with elec-
tricity, natural gas, and heat. Energy hubs participate in the day-ahead power and gas
markets. At the supply side, electricity and natural gas are bought at prices λe and λg,
respectively. At the demand side, electricity and heat are needed. de refers to the real-
time power demand, which is a scalar and its SI unit is Watt. When the energy hub is
going to sign a contract in the day-ahead market, it is not sure about the exact demands
of its customers in the future. Here, system efficiency refers to the expected utility
under demand uncertainty. The utility function can be defined as the profit function,
which is the difference between incomes and costs.
For the sake of conciseness and illustration, we consider two extreme situations
in real time: all the consumers need electricity with a probability of pi and all the
consumers need heat with a probability of 1− pi . For the in-between cases where
both power and heat are needed, the conclusion still holds. The utilities of the energy
hub when it supplies electricity and heat are u1(de) and u2(dh), which are concave,
monotonically increasing, and differentiable [45]. Concavity and monotonicity are
mild assumptions for utilities of smart grid users, as suggested in [46], such as the
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quadratic utility functions used in [45] and the logarithmic utility functions used in
[47]. The energy hub allocates its budget on electricity and natural gas to maximize its
expected utility,
U(de,dh) = E[u] = piu1(de)+(1−pi)u2(dh) (1)
which is also concave. The contour line of the utility is a curve define as U(de,dh) = c
where c is a constant. We write the contour line as an explicit function,
dh = fcont(de) = u−12
(
c−piu1(de)
1−pi
)
Proposition 1. The contour line dh = fcont(de) is a convex function which is decreasing
in the first quadrant.
The monotonicity is clear: because piu1(de) is increasing in de and (1−pi)u2(dh)
is increasing in dh, and their summation is a constant c, the growth in de must lead to
the decrease in dh. To see the convexity, as u1(de) is concave, function
g(de) =
c−piu1(de)
1−pi
is convex. Moreover, since u2(dh) is concave and increasing. Its inverse function u−12
is also increasing with a positive second-order derivative given by,
(u−12 )
′′ =− u
′′
2
(u′2)2
> 0
It implies u−12 is convex. According to the composition law ([48], page 84), function
dh = fcont(de) is also convex.
Assume the energy hub has a total budget of I¯, which is a constant scalar, and θ is
spent on buying power and the rest on natural gas. The energy hub can produce heat
from electricity with an efficiency of ηeh, and can convert natural gas into electricity
and heat with efficiencies of ηge and ηgh, respectively. It is reasonable to make the
following assumptions.
A1. Buying electricity directly is better than buying gas and producing electricity from
gas, i.e.,
1
λe
≥ ηge
λg
(2)
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A2. Both gas and electricity have none-zero contracts in day-ahead markets.
The day-ahead gas/electricity contract might be zero, if the day-ahead price is much
higher than that in the real-time market or buying one kind of energy is more favorable.
However, in such situations, the problem becomes much easier: if both day-ahead
contracts are zero, since no uncertainty exists at the real-time stage, the energy hub can
exactly determine the amount of each kind of energy according to the real demands,
and exchange is not needed; if the day-ahead gas (electricity) contract is zero, which
means all energy hubs buy gas (electricity) only, there is no exchange either. Therefore,
the problem degenerates into a trivial one and we simply exclude this trivial case by
assuming A2.
Because energy hub can switch the usage between electricity and natural gas, im-
plying the potential of energy sharing among different energy hubs, it is interesting to
study how the utilities of individual energy hubs can be improved by allowing energy
exchange. Here, we analyze three emblematic energy hub organization schemes:
1) Individual scheme (IDL): each energy hub makes its decision respectively and no
trading among energy hubs is allowed. Operation of energy hubs following this
scheme has been discussed in the medium-term management problem [49] and the
intra-day decision-making problem [50].
2) Sharing market scheme (SMK): an energy hub can exchange energy with others at
a fixed ratio λM , which is called the price in the sharing market. In fact, it is not
a financial concept with a monetary unit but a barter ratio. It defines how much
electricity can be exchanged with one unit natural gas. In this regard, the sharing
market is a platform for energy sharing without monetary transaction. Operation of
networked microgrids following this scheme can be found in [51], and a decentral-
ized energy exchange strategy for prosumers in smart grid was presented in [52].
3) Aggregation scheme(AGG): a central aggregator (or retailer) is eligible to collect
and redistribute energy among all energy hubs. This scheme has been discussed
under the concept of multi-energy player in electricity markets [40] and in local
energy system [53].
Next we analyze the three organization schemes theoretically.
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(1) Individual (IDL)
In this case, the total budget I¯ is allocated to electricity with the amount of θ and
natural gas with I¯−θ . In the all power demand situation, the electricity supply is,
de =
θ
λe
+
I¯−θ
λg
·ηge (3)
where the first term represents electrical power that is directly purchased from the
power grid, and the second one stands for which is produced by the CHP unit. In
the all heat demand situation, the heat supply is,
dh =
θ
λe
·ηeh+ I¯−θλg ·ηgh (4)
where the first term represents heat that is converted from the electrified heating de-
vices, and the second one stands for heat produced by the CHP unit.
The optimal decision in the IDL scheme is shown in Figure 2. If θ = 0, then
de = ηge I¯/λg and dh = ηgh I¯/λg; if θ = I¯, then de = I¯/λe and dh = ηeh I¯/λe; otherwise
when θ constantly changes from 0 to I¯, the point (de,dh) forms a line segment ab. The
contour line of U(de,dh) is also shown in Figure 2, whose shape has been revealed
in Proposition 1. We can observe that the optimal choice of an energy hub is to buy
electricity as long as Assumption A.1 holds.
(2) Sharing market (SMK)
In the sharing market, energy hubs can trade with each other to meet energy de-
mands. Assume that λM is the price (exchange ratio) at equilibrium, then the energy
supply in the two extreme situations are shown as,
de =
θ
λe
+max
{
I¯−θ
λg
λM,
I¯−θ
λg
ηge
}
dh = max
{
θ
λe
ηeh,
θ
λe
1
λM
ηgh
}
+
I¯−θ
λg
ηgh
(5)
Take the electricity demand for example, the first term represents electrical power that
is directly purchased from the power grid, and the rest can be obtained in two ways:
one is to trade with other hubs in the sharing market, and the other is to dispatch the
CHP. The second term picks up the bigger one in the curly braces. The latter equation
in (5) has a similar interpretation. To analyze the sharing market, we give the following
Lemma.
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Lemma 1. Assume Assumption A.1 and A.2 hold, we have,
ηeh
λe
≤ ηgh
λg
; λM =
λg
λe
; de =
I¯
λe
; dh =
I¯
λe
ηgh (6)
Proof. First of all we consider the first inequality. For the sake of contradiction, assume
ηeh
λe
>
ηgh
λg
It implies that producing heat from electricity is cheaper than using natural gas. More-
over, as indicated by (2), purchasing electricity from the power grid has a lower cost
than buying gas and using CHP units. As a result, all energy hubs will consume elec-
tricity, and natural gas will lose all market share, which is in contradiction with As-
sumption A.2. So
ηeh
λe
≤ ηgh
λg
must hold.
Combined with (2), we have,
ηge ≤ λgλe ≤
ηgh
ηeh
(7)
Next we consider the second assertion. The following discussion is divided into
three cases.
1) If λM ≤ ηge, with (7) we have ηgh/λM ≥ ηeh. Hence the max qualifier in (5) can
be dropped and the energy demands in the two extreme situations can be expressed as,
de =
θ
λe
+
I¯−θ
λg
ηge
dh =
θ
λe
ηgh
λM
+
I¯−θ
λg
ηgh
(8)
We can conclude from (7) that λM ≤ λg/λe. And then we have
ηgh
λeλM
≥ ηgh
λg
which indicates that purchasing electricity from the power grid and trading gas in the
sharing market is a better way than buying natural gas directly for producing heat. So
all energy hubs will buy electricity and no gas contract will be signed, contradicting
Assumption A.2.
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2) If λM > ηge and ηgh/λM ≥ ηeh, then the energy demands in the two extreme
situations can be expressed by,
de =
θ
λe
+λM
I¯−θ
λg
dh =
θ
λe
ηgh
λM
+
I¯−θ
λg
ηgh
(9)
In such a circumstance, if
λM >
λg
λe
or
1
λg
>
1
λeλM
which means that signing a contract with the gas market can get more natural gas than
buying electricity and then trading gas in the sharing market with the same amount of
expenditure. As a consequence, all energy hubs will not buy electricity. On contrary,
no one will buy natural gas. This is in contradiction with the assumption. So we have,
λM =
λg
λe
3) If λM > ηge and ηgh/λM < ηeh, then the energy demands in the two extreme
situations can be written as,
de =
θ
λe
+λM
I¯−θ
λg
dh =
θ
λe
ηeh+
I¯−θ
λg
ηgh
(10)
In such a circumstance, we can conclude that λM > λg/λe owing to the second in-
equality of (7), which is the same to the case we have discussed in Item 2), in which all
energy hubs will buy gas and no electricity contract will be signed.
In summary, λM = λg/λe must hold, implying assertion 2) holds.
Substituting it into (9) yields
de =
I¯
λe
, dh =
I¯
λe
ηgh (11)
Then assertions 3) and 4) hold, which completes the proof.
Equation (11) interprets that an energy hub will purchase both electricity and heat,
and exchange in sharing market depending on whether electricity or heat is needed.
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The optimal strategy of the energy hub in the sharing market is plotted as point c in
Figure 2.
(3) Aggregation (AGG)
In this organization scheme, a large number of energy hubs are coordinated by an
aggregator, who is eligible to sign aggregated contracts with the power and gas markets
on behalf of the energy hubs and redistribute energies among the clients. According to
the Law of Large Numbers in the probability theory, the number of energy hubs which
buy electricity (or natural gas) is Npi (or N(1−pi)). Hence the energy demands satisfy,
Npi ·de = Nθλe
N(1−pi) ·dh = N(I¯−θ)λg ηgh
(12)
From an average point of view, it is,
de =
θ
piλe
, dh =
(I¯−θ)ηgh
(1−pi)λg
The optimal decision in the aggregation mode is also shown in Figure 2. When θ
varies from 0 to I¯, the point (de,dh) forms the line segment de. The optimal solution
will be found at point f where line de is tangent to a contour line of U(de,dh).
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Figure 2: Optimal decisions under three organization modes.
With above analysis, we have the following proposition.
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Figure 3: Structure of a sample energy hub.
Proposition 2. Let EUIDL, EUSMK , and EUAGG be the optimal expected utility U(de,dh)
in the individual, sharing market, and aggregation schemes. There must be,
EUIDL < EUSMK < EUAGG
The relationship of the three organization schemes can be observed from Figure 2.
The optimal expected utilities are evaluated at points b, c, and f. Because U(de,dh) is
increasing in the two inputs, clearly we have EUIDL < EUSMK . Moreover, it is easy
to verify that point c belongs to line segment de, and U(de,dh) perceives the largest
value at point f when the pair (de,dh) varies in the line segment de. Therefore, we have
EUSMK < EUAGG.
3. Implementation in the Integrated Energy System
The conclusion drawn in Proposition 2 is based on the abstract model without re-
flecting practical system configurations. For further investigation, we propose thorough
mathematical formulations for an integrated energy system with a cluster of energy
hubs, which can be modeled as stochastic bilevel problems. In the energy hub level,
stochastic optimization models are adopted to analyze the energy hubs’ strategic be-
haviors under three organization schemes. In the pool-based market level, an ACOPF
model is used to retrieve the LMP. Detailed formulation of each parts are given in the
following subsections.
3.1. Energy Hub Model
Energy hub is the substantial participant in the multi-carrier energy market. In this
paper, we consider an energy hub with two inputs (electricity and gas) and two outputs
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(electricity and heat). Its structure is illustrated in Figure 3. The import electricity can
be transformed into heat by an electric boiler (EB), or be used to charge an electricity
storage unit (ESU). Heat pumps can be modeled by the same way as the EB with
a higher efficiency coefficient. Natural gas is burnt by a CHP unit which generates
electricity and heat. The heat can be stored in a heat storage unit (HSU). Operating
constraints include,
(1−ρit)pe,init + pg,init ηge+ pdisit − pchit = pe,outit (13a)
ρit pe,init ηeh+ p
g,in
it ηgh+h
dis
it −hchit = ph,outit (13b)
Ei(t+1) = Eit + p
ch
it η
+
es− pdisit /η−es , Ei0 = 0 (13c)
Hi(t+1) = Hit +h
ch
it η
+
hs−hdisit η−hs, Hi0 = 0 (13d)
0≤ pchit ≤ uitR+pm, 0≤ pdisit ≤ (1−uit)R−pm (13e)
0≤ hchit ≤ sitR+hm,0≤ hdisit ≤ (1− sit)R−hm (13f)
0≤ Eit ≤ Em,0≤ Hit ≤ Hm (13g)
where ρit represents the proportion of import electricity which is used for heat pro-
duction. Constraints (13a)-(13b) are electric power and thermal balancing conditions;
(13c)-(13d) describe charging dynamics of energy storage units; (13e)-(13f) impose
maximal charging and discharging rates on storage units as well as their complemen-
tarity; (13g) limits the energy stored in the ESU and the HSU. Although the first terms
in (13a) and (13b) are bilinear, they can be replaced by two new variables pe,eit and p
e,h
it
in combination with an equality constraint pe,eit + p
e,h
it = p
e,in
it . In this way, all constraints
in (13) are linear.
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3.2. Real-time Power Market Clearing Model
We assume that the real-time electricity price is equal to the LMP released by a dis-
tribution power market. Because the resistance of distribution lines have notable impact
on LMP, we use the following branch flow model [54] based AC-OPF for distribution
power market clearing in the real-time stage
min ∑c j p j (14a)
s.t. vm− vn = 2(rmnPmn+ xmnQmn)− (r2mn+ x2mn)lmn (14b)
lmnvm = P2mn+Q
2
mn (14c)
pn− pln = ∑
k:n→k
Pnk− (Pmn− lmnrmn) : λn (14d)
qn−qln = ∑
k:n→k
Qnk− (Qmn− lmnxmn) (14e)
P j ≤ p j ≤ P j, Q j ≤ q j ≤ Q j (14f)
vn ≤ vn ≤ vn;0≤ lmn ≤ l¯mn (14g)
where c j and p j are the cost coefficient and output of generation units, respectively.
Objective function (14a) is to minimize the operating cost. Constraints (14b)-(14e)
state the branch flow model developed in [54], which provides the same solution as
the traditional bus injection model for radial networks [55]. pln is the active power
demand at bus n, including the fixed residential/industrial demand and elastic demand
from energy hubs. Dual variable λn associated with nodal active power balancing con-
dition (14d) interprets the LMP. Physical limitations of generator output, bus voltage
magnitudes, and line currents are included in constraints (14f)-(14g). We assume the
real-time power market is cleared every period according to a single-period OPF prob-
lem, which is in compliance with the current power market practice. Hence we omit
the time index in (14). The typical frequency is once per hour.
Remark 1: For the distribution power market, various entities can participate and
bid their demands as shown in Figure 4. Multi-energy trading is restricted at the de-
mand side. For clarity and simplification, this paper only considers the strategic behav-
iors of energy hubs and assumes that the bids of other participants are given as fixed
nodal power demands. Demand response can be incorporated via a price-sensitive load
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with a price-demand function as is suggested in [56].
Power Market Heat Market Gas Market
Energy
Hub
Industrial
Loads
Residential
Loads
Prices Amount Amount Amount
Market Layer
Demand Layer
Figure 4: Structure of the bilevel multi-energy market.
3.3. Holistic Market Configurations
The structure of the integrated energy system is shown in Figure 5. In the day-
ahead market, the energy hubs determine their gas and power consumptions and sign
forward contracts with the power market and natural gas market with fixed prices λ ect
and λ gct . At this time, the exact electricity and heat demands are not known exactly,
and we have probabilistic forecasts on their possible values. When the exact load is
revealed or can be predicted with high accuracy, energy hubs can buy (sell) energies
from (to) the real-time markets. The real-time electricity price is given by the market
clearing problem stated in (14). According to the current gas/heat market organization,
the gas/heat price does not vary intraday, so λ gct and λ hrt are equal to given values.
In addition, energy hubs could convert undesired energy into the desired form and
exchange energies with other hubs. Three organization schemes are considered. For the
individual scheme, energy hubs cannot trade with others, so they must satisfy real-time
energy demands by energy conversion and energy purchase. For the sharing market
scheme, energy hubs can exchange electricity and natural gas with other hubs subject
to an exchange price/ratio. For the aggregation scheme, the retailer will collect and
redistribute energies to all participants.
In analogy to the organization of current deregulated power markets, we consider
two phases in the proposed organization scheme:
Phase 1: Day-ahead stage
Assume that the electricity price is λ ect , and the gas price is λ
gc
t .
For IDL and SMK schemes, each energy hub decides on its contracted electricity
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pe0it and gas p
g0
it . For AGG scheme, the aggregator will collect the demand from all
energy hubs and decide the total contracted electricity ∑i pe0it and total contracted gas
∑i p
g0
it .
Phase 2: Real-time stage
Assume that the electricity price is λ ert (LMP) and the gas price is λ hrt .
For IDL scheme, each energy hub buys/sells electricity δ e±it,w and heat δ
h±
it,w from/to
the real-time market to meet load demand. For SMK scheme, each energy hub can
exchange gas pexit for power p
ex
it λMt,w with other energy hubs at a fixed ratio λMt,w, and
buys/sells electricity δ e±it,w and heat δ
h±
it,w from/to the real-time market to meet load de-
mand. For AGG scheme, the aggregator buys/sells electricity ∑i δ e±it,w and heat ∑i δ
h±
it,w
from/to the real-time market and redistributes the energies to each hub to meet load
demand.
3.4. Formulation of the Market Equilibrium Problems
In the integrated energy system, each energy hub tries to maximize (minimize) its
own utility (payoff). The payoff function of energy hub i has the following form
CHi =∑
t
(
λ ect p
e0
it +λ
gc
t p
g0
it +
Ω
∑
ω=1
piω
[
−λ ert,ωδ e−it,ω
−λ hrt,ωδ h−it,ω +λ ert,ωδ e+it,ω +λ hrt,ωδ h+it,ω +Pen(δ h±it,ω ,δ e±it,ω)
]) (15)
The sum of the first and second terms denotes the cost of buying energies from the day-
ahead markets; the remaining terms describe the income and the payment in real-time
electricity and district heating markets, which are scenario dependent. The last term is
a penalty for being unable to fulfill the contract.
The energy transaction constraints are formulated as,
∑
t
(
λ ect p
e0
it +λ
gc
t p
g0
it
)
≤ I¯ (16a)
pe,outit,ω +δ
e+
it,ω −δ e−it,ω = l˜eit,ω ,∀t (16b)
ph,outit,ω +δ
h+
it,ω −δ h−it,ω = l˜hit,ω ,∀t (16c)
δ e+it,ω , δ
e−
it,ω , δ
h+
it,ω , δ
h−
it,ω , p
e0
it , p
g0
it ≥ 0,∀t (16d)
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Figure 5: Structure of the integrated energy market.
21
where (16a) is the budget limit in the day-ahead market; (16b) and (16c) are the real-
time power and heat balance conditions; (16d) prevents negative values on decision
variables.
As mentioned above, apart from energy transaction with the pool-based distribu-
tion market, the organization scheme of energy hubs also affects the economical effi-
ciency. Next, we set forth the energy hub decision problems under the three organiza-
tion schemes.
(1) Individual scheme. Under this setting, each energy hub makes decision indi-
vidually and cannot trade with other hubs. In the real-time, they narrow the gap be-
tween forward contract and real demand by using conversion facilities, such as electric
boilers, CHPs and storage units. The problem for each energy hub i is shown below.
min CHi
s.t. energy transaction constraints (16)
hub operating constraints (13)
market clearing condition (14), ∀t
pe0it = p
e,in
it,ω , p
g0
it = p
g,in
it,ω ,∀i,∀t

, ∀i (17)
The last constraint characterizes energy availability in the individual setting. Because
energy exchange among hubs is prohibited, the import energies follow the forward
contracts. Moreover, the real time electricity price λ ert is determined by the market
clearing problem (14). Thus, problem (17) is in fact a bilevel program, whose solution
strategy will be illuminated in the next section.
(2) Sharing market scheme. Under this setting, energy hubs have more flexibility
because they can trade with each other. Let λMt,ω be the sharing market price in scenario
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ω at period t. The problem for each energy hub i is shown below
min CHi
s.t. energy transaction constraints (16)
hub operating constraints (13)
market clearing condition (14), ∀t
pe0it − pexit,ωλMt,ω = pe,init,ω ,∀t
pg0it + p
ex
it,ω = p
g,in
it,ω ,∀t

, ∀i
∑NEi=1 pexit,ω = 0,∀t
(18)
The constraints in (18) are similar to those in (17) except for the energy allocation
conditions. In this setting, the imports of energy hubs come not only from the forward
contracts but also from the energy exchanges in the sharing market. In addition, the
total natural gas exchange in the system in every period should be balanced (so should
the electricity), which is ensured by the last equality. Problem (18) can be transformed
to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, which will be detailed in the
next section.
(3)Aggregation scheme. Under this setting, the retailer/aggregator is responsible
for collecting the requirements of all energy hubs and makes a centralized decision.
The problem for the retailer is shown below,
min ∑NEi=1 CHi
s.t. energy transaction constraints (16), ∀i
hub operating constraints (13), ∀i
market clearing condition (14), ∀t,∀i
NE
∑
i=1
pe0it =
NE
∑
i=1
pe,init,ω ,
NE
∑
i=1
pg0it =
NE
∑
i=1
pg,outit,ω ,∀t,∀i
(19)
Compared to problem (18), problem (19) minimizes the total payoff of all energy hubs
subject to the Cartesian product of their feasible regions together with a system-level
import energy constraint depending on the forward energy contracts.
It can be observed that the difference among problems (17)-(19) mainly stems from
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the energy allocation conditions. The feasible region becomes more relaxed when the
organization switches from individual to sharing market and moreover to aggregation.
4. Solution Methodology
The energy hubs’ problems (17) and (18) in individual and sharing market schemes
are multi-leader single-follower games, where the follower problem captures the mar-
ket clearing process. The remaining one has a single retailer in the upper level, and
comes down to a traditional bilevel program or a Stackelberg game. In this section, we
first show the former two problems are actually potential games, so their objective can
be aggregated into a single one for the ease of computation. Then we present MILP
approximations for problems (17)-(19), which can be solved efficiently by commercial
software. By exploiting the problem structure, our method does not rely on KKT opti-
mality conditions, and is more efficient and scalable compared with existing methods
for bi-level programs.
4.1. Additivity of the Objective Functions
In problem (17), although the objective functions are totally decoupled, the market
clearing condition depends on the joint actions of all energy hubs. Therefore, the indi-
vidual problems for each hub are still correlated. Nevertheless, the following proposi-
tion asserts that their objective functions can be added together, resulting in a traditional
Stackelberg game.
Proposition 3. Problem (17) and the following Stackelberg game share the same equi-
librium solution.
min ∑NEi=1 CHi
s.t. energy transaction constraints (16), ∀i
hub operating constraints (13)
market clearing condition (14), ∀t
pe0it = p
e,in
it,ω , p
g0
it = p
g,in
it,ω ,∀i,∀t
(20)
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According to the property of potential games [57], it is easy to verify that fatk =
∑NEi C
H
i is a potential function for problem (17). The result of single-level potential
games has been generalized to bilevel games in [58]. The equilibrium consistency
between a multi-leader common-follower game and its corresponding potential Stack-
elberg game is demonstrated by comparing their stationarity conditions. Proposition 3
is a straightforward application of the outcome therein. By such equivalence, we can
also claim that problem (17) possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium as long as problem
(20) has a feasible solution (since it must be bounded).
A similar conclusion holds for problem (18) and the following Stackelberg game:
min ∑NEi=1 CHi
s.t. energy transaction constraints (16), ∀i
hub operating constraints (13)
market clearing condition (14), ∀t
pe0it − pexit,ωλMt,ω = pe,init,ω ,∀t,∀i
pg0it + p
ex
it,ω = p
g,in
it,ω ,∀t, ∀i
∑NEi=1 pexit,ω = 0,∀t,∀i
(21)
Since no competition exists in the upper levels of problems (20) and (21), they
are easier to solve than the original ones in (17) and (18). A problem remaining to
be answered is: why will the energy hubs form a whole coalition? Is it possible that
multiple smaller sharing markets exist at the same time?
Proposition 4. All the energy hubs will take part in a whole sharing market.
This proposition is a natural implication of the coalition based cooperative game
theory. Suppose that there are two sub-markets, and if they could exchange energy
with the each other following the rule of energy trading and clearing in (18), then the
total payoff must be no greater than the sum of respective sub-markets. That is because,
two independent operating sub-markets is simply a special case of the whole sharing
market, where the energy exchange between two sub-markets is prohibited. So the
operating feasible region of the whole sharing market is enlarged. In this regard, the
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cooperation among energy hubs can be described as a super additive game, where the
grant coalition must grab the highest profit (or the lowest cost) [59].
Standard approaches for solving a bi-level program relies on replacing the lower-
level problem with its KKT optimality conditions. However, in problems (19)-(21),
the market clearing problem in the lower level are non-convex, and KKT conditions
are only necessary and remain computational challenging. In what follows, we will
develop a decomposition method for coping with such an issue by exploiting the fact
that only the LMP at a single bus is involved.
4.2. Mixed Integer Linear Programming based Approximations
To overcome the computation challenges brought by the lower-level market clear-
ing problem and solve problems (19)-(21) in a systematic way, they are approximated
by MILPs after performing the following three steps. The motivation of performing
linearization is raised by observing the matter of fact: the majority of constraints are
linear in our model. If we can linearize the objective function and the few nonlin-
ear constraints generated by the primal-dual condition, the problem becomes an MILP
which can be solved efficiently by CPLEX. The benefit is that the (approximate) global
optimal solution can be found in reasonable time while a nonlinear model can only be
solved locally.
(1) Portraying the LMP curve
Problem (14) is non-convex due to the quadratic equality (14c). The convex re-
laxation method [54] is performed which replaces “=” in (14c) with “≥”, as such
the non-convex quality is turned into a rotated second-order cone. Sufficient condi-
tions that guarantee the exactness of such a convex relaxation are revealed in [60],
and are usually satisfied in most distribution systems with radial topology. Given the
net injections, the relaxed problem, i.e., an second-order cone problem (SOCP), can
be efficiently solved, and the LMP λ at the connection bus can be retrieved from the
dual variable associated with the nodal active power balancing equality in (14d). This
function is supported in off-the-shelf solvers, such as MOSEK.
Changing the power demand at the connection bus over a desired interval, and
recording the corresponding values of λ , we obtain the LMP-demand curve needed in
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Figure 6: Piecewise constant approximation of the LMP curve.
the payoff function (15). When such a function is explicitly given, the market clearing
problems (14) can be omitted from problems (19)-(21).
(2) Piecewise constant representation of the LMP curve
Another difficulty that prevents problem (19)-(21) from being efficiently solved
is the product terms in the payoff function (15), which consist of the multiplication
of LMP variables and energy quantity variables, because they are bilinear thus non-
convex. Our strategy is to approximate the LMP curve through a piecewise constant
function which is expressed via binary variables, and then linearize each product term
using integer programming techniques.
To this end, the feasible interval of demand is partitioned into S−1 segments (asso-
ciated with binary variables βs, s= 1, · · · , S−1) by S breakpoints p1, · · · , pS (associated
with continuous weight variables αs, s = 1, · · · , S). In the s-th interval between ps and
ps+1, the value of λ is approximated by the arithmetic mean λs = 0.5[λ (ps)+λ (ps+1)],
s= 1, · · · , S−1, as illustrated in Figure 6. Such a paradigm does not require a continu-
ous assumption on the LMP curve, which is important because LMP could be discon-
tinuous [61]. As a result, an arbitrary LMP-demand curve λ (p) can be approximated
by a piecewise constant function with an MILP-compatible form as follows,
p =∑Ss=1αs ps, λ =∑
S−1
s=1 βsλs (22a)
α1 ≤ β1, αS ≤ βS−1 (22b)
αs ≤ βs−1+βs, s = 2, · · · ,S−1 (22c)
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αs ≥ 0, s = 1, · · · ,S, ∑Ss=1αs = 1 (22d)
βs ∈ {0,1},s = 1, · · · ,S−1, ∑S−1s=1 βs = 1 (22e)
In (22), binary variable βs = 1 indicates interval s is activated, and constraint (22e)
ensures that only one interval will be activated; Furthermore, constraints (22b)-(22d)
enforce weight coefficients αs, s = 1, · · · , S to be a special-ordered set of type-2, i.e.,
only adjacent two elements can be strictly positive, and their summation is 1, whereas
the rest are equal to 0; Finally, constraint (22a) expresses p and λ via the linear com-
bination of sampled values.
(3) Linearizing the objective function
The advantage of piecewise constant formulation (22) lies in the binary expression
of λ , such that the product λδ involving another continuous variable δ can be easily
linearized via the integer programming technique. To see this, expand λ using the
formula in (22a), λδ = ∑S−1s=1 βsλsδ , where βs is binary, λs is constant, and δ is non-
negative and continuous. Let γs = βsδ , the product λδ has a linear form ∑S−1s=1 λsγs, and
the relation among γs, βs, and δ is captured by,
0≤ δ − γs ≤M(1−βs), 0≤ γs ≤Mβs (23)
where M is a constant which is greater than the value of δ at optimum. From (23), we
can observe: whenever βs = 0, γs = 0 is imposed by the second inequality, and the first
constraint is redundant; otherwise, if βs = 1, γs = δ is enforced by the first inequality,
and the second one is redundant. In either case, γs = βsδ holds true.
Apply the above procedure to terms λ ert δ
e−
it , λ
hr
t δ
h−
it in energy hub payoff function
(15), problems (19)-(21) can boil down to MILPs. An appealing feature is that the sizes
of these MILPs are independent to the scale of the distribution system, since the exact
AC power flow model has already been taken into account during the construction
of the LMP curve. If the energy is connected to different buses, the situation will
be much more complicated because we need an LMP surface with multiple inputs.
Nevertheless, in the sharing market or the aggregation mode, energy hub should be
geographically close to each other for the ease of energy delivery, so the proposed
approach is appropriate in this special application.
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Remark 2:There are some optimization algorithms and software tools for nonlin-
ear mixed integer programming, which might be used to solve this problem. In the
literature, there have been some researches on the comparison of genetic algorithm
(GA) based methods and MILP based methods. An improved real-coded genetic algo-
rithm and an enhanced MILP based method were used to solve the unit commitment
and economic dispatch of microgrids and compared in terms of computational time
and accuracy in [62]. The results show that the MILP method needs less time to con-
verge, while the GA method can achieve higher accuracy but is much more time costly.
Admittedly, an improved GA method may solve our problem; however, as this paper
mainly focus on economic efficiency difference among three organization schemes, so
we just use the MILP approximation to solve it efficiently.
5. Case Studies
5.1. System Configuration
Numerical experiments were conducted on a modified IEEE 33-bus distribution
system to validate the proposed model and theory. The topology of the test system is
shown in Figure 7; the sites of 5 generators are marked in the same figure. The group
of 30 energy hubs is connected to bus 3. We consider a dispatch period of 4 hours. The
day-ahead gas price λ gct , day-ahead electricity price λ ect , and real-time heat price λ hrt
are shown in Table 1. Other data of each energy hub are listed in Table 2. The load
uncertainty is assumed to have a normal distribution. The predicted electric load in
each period is [3.74, 3.75, 4.12, 3.73]MWh, and the predicted heat load in each period
is [2.18, 2.25, 3.45, 2.89]MWh. The standard deviation is set as 0.2. A fast-forward
scenario reduction method based on the Kontorwish distance [63] is used for scenario
selection. 5 typical scenarios are selected in the benchmark case. All the data of the
test system can be found in [64]. MILP models were solved by CPLEX12.6 on a laptop
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU with 2.00GHz and 8 GB of RAM.
5.2. Benchmark Case
Numerical results for the market models under three organization schemes are listed
in Table 3. The computational time is acceptable in all the tests. The payoffs satisfy
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Figure 7: Topology of 33-node power system
Table 1: Energy prices ($/MWh)
Period 1 2 3 4
λ gct 145.6 151.9 157.4 149.2
λ ect 264.9 270.6 272.2 262.4
λ hrt 328.0 337.8 345.2 332.1
Table 2: Energy hub data
Para. MW Para. MW Para. no unit
pch [0,2.0] E [0,10] ηes 0.98
pdis [0,2.0] H [0,10] ηhs 0.98
hch [0,2.0] ηeh 0.98 I¯ 5000
hdis [0,2.0] ηgh 0.65 ηge 0.35
ECIDL(= $69194.11)> ECSMK(= $65528.38)> ECAGG(= $65267.25), which is con-
sistent with Proposition 2. The total electric power demand and natural gas demand
in the day-ahead market vary with time periods and depend on various factors, e.g.,
energy price, energy conversion efficiencies and storage capacities. For example, in
period 3, although the day-ahead gas price is cheaper than the electricity price, energy
hubs barely buy gas because of the low gas-to-power conversion efficiency; although
the day-ahead electricity price in period 1 is cheaper than those in periods 2-3, the
contracted power in period 1 is zero. That is because the gas price in period 1 is low
and the energy hubs can buy gas in period 1, turning it into electricity and shifting it to
other periods using energy storage units.
In addition, the MILP approximation accuracy can be adjusted by changing the
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Table 3: Results in the benchmark case
IDL SMK AGG
Time (s) 8.78 38.71 10.37
expected cost ($) 69194.11 65528.38 65267.25
∑i pe0i1 (MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00
∑i pe0i2 (MWh) 1.30 9.81 2.71
∑i pe0i3 (MWh) 72.45 65.98 69.65
∑i pe0i4 (MWh) 30.94 27.73 30.65
∑i p
g0
i1 Sm
3h 466.07 466.32 466.32
∑i p
g0
i2 Sm
3h 298.09 277.86 301.81
∑i p
g0
i3 Sm
3h 0.00 14.23 0.00
∑i p
g0
i4 Sm
3h 57.93 65.30 56.94
Table 4: Optimal Values and computational time under different number of segments
Segments 3 4 5 6 7
IDL
Value($) 69244.30 69194.11 69180.48 69186.68 69194.41
Time(s) 11.72 8.78 213.46 525.35 879.59
SMK
Value($) 65562.82 65528.38 65530.41 65596.30 65546.54
Time(s) 30.78 38.71 275.52 629.88 1933.72
AGG
Value($) 65319.86 65267.25 65254.62 65263.41 65271.85
Time(s) 15.03 10.37 249.03 603.22 676.85
number of segments in linearization. Table 4 shows that, the linearized model with 4
segments maintains a satisfactory balance between computational time and accuracy.
5.3. Impact of Sampling and scenarios
To examine the impact of random sampling and the fast-forward scenario reduc-
tion technique, we repeat the benchmark case 5 times. The average costs and relative
standard deviation (RSD) are recorded in Table 5. Proposition 2 holds true in this set
of tests. The RSD is always less than 2%, indicating that the selected 5 scenarios can
mimic the uncertainty with satisfactory accuracy. The average computation time is
listed in Table 5, confirming the efficiency of the proposed MILP solution approach.
Then, we test the impact of the number of scenarios on the market equilibrium.
More scenarios are incorporated in our stochastic models (19)-(21). The costs and
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Table 5: Costs ($) and computational time (s) under different samples
Type IDL SMK AGG
Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time
1 68659.9 7.73 65119.8 47.12 64853.6 12.26
2 70440.9 10.59 66626.8 21.35 66363.4 11.78
3 70227.9 11.52 67055.9 46.61 66842.3 16.52
4 71661.3 9.72 68004.9 48.21 67740.1 14.89
5 69194.1 8.78 65528.4 38.71 65267.3 10.37
Avg. 70036.8 66467.1 66213.3
RSD 1.67 % 1.75 % 1.77 %
Table 6: Costs ($) and computational time (s) under numbers of scenarios
Type IDL SMK AGG
Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time
5 69011.1 11.14 65936.6 43.44 65690.2 17.75
6 68951.1 30.68 65769.8 57.06 65477.4 30.94
7 69589.5 36.98 65858.6 67.27 65591.5 56.23
8 68694.8 53.80 64996.9 113.24 64786.0 84.02
9 69432.5 55.97 65944.3 208.87 65678.2 127.65
computational time are listed in TABLE 6. The expected costs change little when
more scenarios are included, showing that five scenarios are enough in this case. It
takes longer time to solve the problem with the increasing number of scenarios, but the
overall efficiency is satisfactory, validating the scalability of the proposed method.
5.4. Impact of the Number of Energy Hubs
The number of energy hubs is an pivotal factor that influences the performance
of different organization schemes. The extreme case is that there is only one energy
hub, in which the organization schemes are actually the same. We change the num-
ber of hubs from 10 to 60, meanwhile, we maintain the total capacity of energy hubs
unchanged to eliminate their influence on the real-time LMP and distribution system
operation security. The expected costs in the three organization schemes are shown in
Figure 8; The differences between any two schemes are presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 8: Costs under different numbers of energy hub.
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Figure 9: Cost Difference under different numbers of energy hub.
Several interesting phenomena are revealed. First, Proposition 2 always holds re-
gardless of the number N of energy hubs. Moreover, with the growth of N, the cost dif-
ferences between any two organization schemes first increase and then tend to be con-
stant as in Figure 9. This is because although the demand of a single energy hub is ran-
dom, the total demand of the group of energy hubs may exhibit weaker volatility. For
example, suppose when N = 1, the expectation is 3MW, and the variance is 0.04MW2,
then if N = 50, the expectation (variance) of each hubs is 0.06MW (1.6×10−5MW2);
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according to the Central Limit Theorem (or Large Number Law), the expected gross
demand is still 3MW, but the variance of gross demand is only 0.0008MW2. In reality,
this means the more energy hubs involved, and smaller uncertainty the system needs to
cope with. As a result, the cost differences change little when N ≥ 20. The co-operation
among larger number of market participants can bring more cost reduction.
5.5. Impact of Uncertainty
The degree of load uncertainty is another factor that greatly affects the costs of
energy hubs. In this test, load uncertainty still follows the Normal distribution with
expected values given in Subsection 5.1, and other system data are the same with the
benchmark case. We change the standard deviation of the Normal distribution from 0
to 0.4 MW, the expected costs in the three organization schemes are shown in Figure
10.
When the standard deviation is equal to 0, which means load is deterministic, all the
energy hubs can sign exactly contracts in the day-ahead market and there is no need for
real-time energy exchange as the day-ahead prices are always lower than the real-time
energy prices. In such a circumstance, all three organization schemes share the same
cost. With an increasing level of uncertainty, the expected costs grow accordingly.
Nonetheless, when the uncertainty is small (σ < 0.2MW), the expected costs in SMK
and AGG scheme are scarcely influenced thanks to the energy exchange in the real-time
stage. Even in the presence of large uncertainty, the cost growth rates in the SMK and
AGG modes are smaller than that in the IDL mode due to the redistribution of energy
in real time. This means that with a higher level of uncertainty, the cost differences
between IDL and SMK, IDL and AGG rise, and thus the potential of cost reduction
increases.
We can also find that, in the aforementioned cases, the cost differences between
SMK and AGG are tiny, showing that the sharing market mode can acheive relatively
high efficiency. Meanwhile, compared with the AGG mode, sharing market does not
require a central coordinator, so that it is easier for application. Managing the energy
hubs via the sharing market is promising.
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Figure 10: Costs under different standard deviation.
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Figure 11: Costs under different budgets.
5.6. Impact of Budget
We change the budget of each energy hub from $4600 to $5400, and the expected
costs in the three organization schemes are shown in Figure 11; The relative difference
between any two schemes are presented in Figure 12.
When the budget I¯ increases, the total cost of IDL scheme is larger than that of
SMK scheme while the cost of AGG is always the least, which is in compliance with
Proposition 2. From Figure 11, we can find that the costs under three schemes all de-
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Figure 12: Cost relative differences under different budgets.
cline with the growth of I¯. This is because when I¯ rises, the energy hubs have larger
feasible space in the day-ahead market and their flexibility in real time is also enhanced.
In Figure 12, the relative differences between IDL and AGG, IDL and SMK increase
rapidly while the relative difference between SMK and AGG grows moderately. When
more budgets is available in the day-ahead market, more energies will be bought, en-
riching the deployable resource in the real-time stage. In this regard, SMK and AGG
schemes can cut down more costs. The relative difference between SMK and AGG is
tiny, showing that SMK scheme can achieve a high efficiency similar to AGG.
5.7. Impact of Penalty Factor
we multiply the penalty factor with a ratio varying from 0.5 to 1.5 and other pa-
rameters remain the same as the benchmark case. The expected costs in the three
organization schemes are shown in Figure 13; The relative differences between any
two schemes are presented in Figure 14.
From Figure 13, we can find that Proposition 2 is always satisfied under differ-
ent penalty factors. With the growth of penalty factor, the total costs in three market
schemes all increase. The reason behind is straightforward: when the penalty factor is
increasing, the extra costs for unfulfilled demand rise and so do the total costs. When
the penalty cost accounts for a larger proportion of the total cost, the advantage of
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Figure 14: Cost relative differences under different penalty factors.
SMK and AGG schemes in cost reduction is more evident. We can see from Figure 14
that the relative differences between IDL and AGG, IDL and SMK increase with the
penalty factor. Meanwhile, the relative difference between SMK and AGG is nearly
constant, implying that under such penalty factors, the flexibility of SMK and AGG is
fully exercised, and further increase in punishment cannot make a great difference.
Remark 3: The pool-market in the distribution system is organized by distribution
system operator (DSO). The sharing market could be organized by a non-profit inter-
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mediary entity. We have concluded that the sharing market scheme can achieve nearly
optimal efficiency without a central coordinator. Both the energy hubs and distribution
system can benefit from our findings. If energy hubs implement the proposed method
in a sharing market, they would have more flexibility in real-time and can reduce op-
eration costs; for the distribution system, a certain fraction of demand uncertainty is
mitigated in sharing market at the demand side, so the uncertainty faced by DSO is
lessened.
6. Conclusions
Technologies of poly-generation are becoming increasingly mature nowadays. To
promote the use of energy hubs, an effective business pattern is an important prerequi-
site. This paper presents a theoretical study on the efficiencies of individual, sharing,
and aggregation schemes for managing a cluster of energy hubs with multiple energy
demands. Under the individual scheme, each energy hub decides its own energy pur-
chase plan without energy exchange with others. Under the sharing scheme, there is
no central aggregator, each energy hub can decide its own energy purchase plan from
the pool-market and also exchange energy with other hubs. Under the aggregation
scheme, an aggregator collects the demand information from all energy hubs, signs
day-ahead contracts on behalf of them and allocates energies to each hub in real-time.
Utility curves of respective schemes are revealed, based on which the efficiencies are
compared. The optimal energy exchange rate in the sharing scheme, which is called
the price in the sharing market, is shown to be the day-ahead gas price to electricity
price ratio. Concrete energy hub decision-marking models under each scheme are re-
formulated as MILP problems based upon duality theory, linearization techniques and
theories of potential game and cooperative game. The optimal solution interprets the
equilibrium in the market. Case studies convey the following information:
1) The aggregation scheme is the most efficient; the sharing market scheme has
near optimal performance compared to the aggregation in various aspects, and requires
no central coordinator, thus could be a promising direction in the future.
2) The performance of the sharing scheme depends on the number of energy hubs
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that take part in the market. The more, the better.
3) A proper designed penalty factor can fully exercise the flexibility of sharing
without adding too much burden on each energy hubs.
To deploy sharing market scheme, an important task is to set up a platform (maybe
electronic) which allows the clients to announce their needs and willingness to share.
Sophisticated smart meters are also indispensable devices in the transition to the shar-
ing economy. The analysis in this paper provides useful insights for designing policies
for residential energy hubs and energy markets in the future. And the mathematical
model in this paper could serve as the fundamental tool for studying a wide spectrum
of market problems raised in multi-resource energy markets. Future research directions
include the market power analysis as well as the market impact of sharing economy.
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